Pdf download pdf tunisias islamists and the turkish model

Marks calls for a more nuanced understanding of Ennahda and how it has operated in the Tunisian political scene. Drawing on extensive field research and interviews with Tunisian political figures and activists, Marks argues that Ennahda should be understood as a party of evolving positions and internal debate, rather than an Islamist monolith unwilling to give ground on key issues.

As First Vice-President of the Constituent Assembly, Labidi officially held the most powerful political position of any woman in the Arab world. She has been an active figure in Tunisian opposition politics for decades. Under Ben Ali, Ms.

Jribi was the leading female opposition politician in the PDP party, which changed its name to Al-Joumhouri after the revolution. Shortened transcripts of the interviews Ms. Marks conducted in April follow below. This report comprehensively evaluates the dynamics and impact of international expert assistance in Tunisia between in the areas of media reform, security sector reform, judicial reform and youth employment. Based on over It also highlights issues and measures to address system-wide problems in the international response to transitions within and beyond the Arab world.

Publication Date: Mar 6, Tunisian Women's Rights before and after the Revolution more. This book chapter offers an overview of challenges and opportunities for Tunisian women's rights before and after Tunisia's revolution.

Many Tunisian civil society leaders fear the passage of two controversial laws in coming days the Reconciliation Law and the Protection of Security Forces Act will undermine the country's anti-corruption drive — and its fledgling Many Tunisian civil society leaders fear the passage of two controversial laws in coming days the Reconciliation Law and the Protection of Security Forces Act will undermine the country's anti-corruption drive — and its fledgling democracy.

This short analysis explores factors that have motivated Ennahda leaders to pursue an accommodationist posture vis a vis old regime elements in Tunisia, and explores the tensions this posture is causing within Ennahda party. This analysis offers an in-depth examination of Ennahda's historic May 10th party congress. At that event, Ennahda-- Tunisia's center-right Islamist party-- made a number of groundbreaking changes: easing membership, separating I contest the notion that Tunisia's trade union UGTT , which led the mediation process, was an apolitical actor I contest the notion that Tunisia's trade union UGTT , which led the mediation process, was an apolitical actor.

Instead, I argue that this crucial juncture in Tunisia's transition should be understood as a triangulated power struggle pitting three political actors, each with their own interests, against one another: Tunisia's trade union UGTT , its center-right Islamist Ennahda party, and old regime elites.

This analysis situates Tunisia's Nobel Peace Prize victory in the context of its economic, political, and counter-terrorism challenges. It critically examines how executive powers in Tunisia have historically used "unity" and It critically examines how executive powers in Tunisia have historically used "unity" and "consensus" as pluralism-eroding cudgels. I argue that whether Tunisia consolidates its fledgling democracy or, victimised again by terrorism, slips into authoritarian counter-revolution depends largely on whether its leaders — with the support of international partners, including the European Union and the United States — implement reforms driven by inclusive dialogue.

This op-ed was written days after a jihadist gunman killed 38 tourists on a beach in Sousse, Tunisia. It argues Tunisia's leaders can inspire citizens to unite against Islamic State propaganda by laying out a clearer, more inspiring It argues Tunisia's leaders can inspire citizens to unite against Islamic State propaganda by laying out a clearer, more inspiring vision of citizen-oriented reforms.

International actors can likewise provide smarter, more concretely targeted support to help Tunisia meet these goals. Publisher: Washington Post, Monkey Cage. A detailed analysis of the coalition government formed in the wake of Tunisia's elections. The two parties that placed on top -- Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda -- were mutually opposed, but nevertheless managed to form a coalition The two parties that placed on top -- Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda -- were mutually opposed, but nevertheless managed to form a coalition government in February under the leadership of Prime Minister Habib Essid.

In this piece, I lay out the political dynamics and calculations behind this government's formation, including internal debates this coalition provoked within both the Nidaa Tunis and Ennahda parties. The reality is far more complex.

This analysis aims to disaggregate simplified understandings of Salafism that dominated the discourse on religious conservatism and violent extremism in Tunisia in and I wrote this piece in response to the September attack I wrote this piece in response to the September attack on the US Embassy in Tunis, which involved Salafi jihadists as organizers and young supporters.

Following the Arab uprisings, Tunisian and Egyptian Islamists repurposed the Turkish model as a way to signal to the West that their vision of political. The lessons of the Turkish experience are especially relevant in dealing with the opposition and democratization, as well as achieving stability and growth.

Edward Singleton's Ownd. Pdf download pdf tunisias islamists and the turkish model. Three years later, following the failed coup attempt in Turkey in July , flags, scarves, pins, stickers, and banners with the Rabaa symbol were featured in pro-government rallies.

By extending its umbrella of pro- tection to the Brotherhood and explicitly adopting Rabaa as a rallying cry, the AKP symbolically presented itself as an integral partner and defender of Islamist movements in the region. By contrast, Ennahda saw in the AKP a valuable friend and sympathetic ear in the region. Comparing Party Congresses Despite their many real and perceived similarities, the AKP and En- nahda possess strikingly different internal organizations.

Meanwhile, Ennahda, which was already more internally pluralistic than the AKP, has pushed to diversify party membership, and has recently experienced calls for greater bot- tom-up representation in its internal electoral structures. The first, supported by party president Ghannouchi, pro- posed retaining the existing system, according to which the president appointed all board members and the elected member majlis shura Shura Council then confirmed them.

One, proposed by long-time Ennahda leader Abdellatif Me- kki, called for the Shura Council to elect the members of the Executive Board. The second, put forward by Abdelhamid Jelassi, called for a mix- ture of the two models election of one-third of the Executive Board by the Shura Council. The delegates then voted to maintain the current system. When asked why Ennahda structures its internal hierarchy in this way, nahdawis respond that it is because the party formed during and in opposition to dictatorship, and that institu- tionalized governance—as opposed to the personalization of power—is a core part of its identity.

This self-critique was the product of multiple committees and months of research, culminating in a draft document read to and adopted by the tenth congress. Ennahda used the opportunity to drive home the importance of learning from its mistakes. In his opening speech on May 20, delivered before a stadium full of En- nahda members and a national television audience, Ghannouchi repeat- edly cited the importance of self-criticism.

Turkey has become a de facto if not yet de jure presidential system with increasingly sultanistic char- acteristics.

All the people in Turkey, we are all praying that he lives for a very long time. Then he can step back, so that Turkey, like a young baby, can walk on its own. But some AKP members have suggested that this type of personality is not what Tunisia needs in a leader. They ask how we broke these [anti-Islamist] perceptions. I always say that we had one person, one four-star general, and we all loved him. They [Ennahda] need someone who can take them in a similar way and pull them from these struggles.

This notion struck most members of the AKP as mildly absurd. The prophet [PBUH] did not have to ask for advice from anyone, but he chose to. So should our leaders.